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Abstract: 
Few observers will have noticed that Turkey is second only to the US in 
having large parts of its army stationed abroad. This contribution will 
focus on these interventions - which are diverse in nature and political 
origin. Featuring the second largest territorial army within NATO and 
only recently exploring its regional and, to some extent, global 
geopolitical ambitions, Turkey’s interventionism is ambiguous and 
remains difficult to make sense of. While Turkey’s interventions may not 
confront Western interests to the same extent Russia’s do, operations like 
in Cyprus, nevertheless cause a general sense of unease about this middle-
ranking regional power conducting large scale military interventions. 




the West. Starting from Turkey’s participation in the Korean War, there is, 
conversely, a longer history of Turkey playing an integral role in Western 
interventionism. More recently, Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East, 
and particularly in Syria, has given rise to claims that it continues to 
pursue a ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy. The short history presented here 
reflects on the politically awkward position Turkey’s interventionism takes 
up in between ambitions for regional hegemony, a rising global power and 
an integral part of the liberal Western order. 
 
Conventional approaches to intervention and liberal state building assume Western agency 
albeit more often than not implemented through international organisations such as the UN. 
While there are exceptions, regional powers tend to conduct operations in line with Western 
objectives where their interests intersect with ‘universal’ liberal interventionist goals, 
frequently under the umbrella of regional organisations.  
Turkey’s regional military actions do not fit these conventional patterns. Neither 
directly supporting nor outright opposing the West as a whole, the second largest territorial 
army within NATO pursues regional and increasingly global geopolitical ambitions of which 
it is difficult to make sense. While Turkey’s interventions may not confront Western interests 
in the same way Russia’s do, some certainly clash with those of individual Western powers, 
notably of the United States.1 Ever since its first minor incursions in Cyprus in 1964 to its 
contemporary large-scale interventions in Syria and Iraq, there is a general sense of unease 
about this middle-ranking regional power conducting large scale military interventions, most 
of which are not directly sanctioned by any international institution.  
Far from these making Turkey a renegade member of the Western alliance, these 




interventionism. Most notable are Turkish involvement in the Korean War, in NATO 
missions in Afghanistan, as well as other NATO operations, such as those in the former 
Yugoslavia. These are frequently forgotten as attention focuses on Turkey’s independent 
interventions in its immediate geopolitical environment. Debates on recent regional 
interventions are more developed, partly because they constitute a significant departure from 
Turkey’s traditional policy based on territorial saturation and, precisely, non-intervention.  
Most accounts associate this alleged departure from established principles with 
Turkey’s potential or actual ‘neo-Ottoman’2, ‘pan-Islamist’3 or ‘Eurasianist’4 foreign policy 
‘turn’. This contrast between Turkey’s ‘old’ Westernism and ‘new’ independence naturalises 
its NATO membership which emerged out of a particular historical conjuncture, motivated 
by specific geopolitical conditions. Having established a strong sense of isolationism after its 
War of Independence in 1923, Turkey developed from an anti-colonial into a pro-Western 
power in 1952 as a result of Stalin’s designs on Turkish territory.5 The commitment to 
territorial saturation encapsulated in Ataturk’s famous “Peace at Home, Peace Abroad” 
formula remained. Having committed to the anti-communist camp with its contribution to the 
Korean War and the Baghdad Pact, Turkey became a pillar in the American-led order in the 
Middle East, especially after the ‘loss’ of Iran in 1979. So, while Turkey’s foreign policy 
orientation was defensive, its departure from the non-aligned into the Western camp, made 
explicit during the Bandung conference, was only gradual and never without contradictions.  
Turkey’s career as an independent interventionist power started during the first signs of 
conflict in Cyprus during the 1960s, when plans for an intervention on behalf of the Turkish 
Cypriot minority were drawn up. The 1974 Cyprus intervention was initially legitimized by 
Turkey’s right to protect the Turkish Cypriot community under the Treaty of Guarantee after 
a coup d’état backed by the Greek military junta aimed for a unification with Greece. Over 




which was not backed by international law and opposed by Turkey’s NATO allies. Despite 
Turkey’s importance in a Middle East framed by Cold War geopolitics, the US administration 
reacted with an arms embargo against its ally. Criticisms of what many, including many 
Turkish Cypriots, now label a form of colonialism,6 is easily obscured by what is effectively 
a purely Greek Cypriot administration’s efforts to isolate and penalise the Turkish part of its 
citizenry. Despite this structural discrimination, the magnitude of Turkey’s military presence 
(including control over the Turkish Cypriot civil police force), socio-economic penetration, 
and increasing levels of political influence, leave no doubt about its de-facto client status with 
little to no independence from mainland Turkey. Turkish Cyprus, despite having developed 
independently from Turkey under British colonial rule, is referred to as ‘Yavru Vatan’, or 
‘Baby Fatherland’ by many Turks. 
This longer view on Turkey’s interventionism demonstrates that despite the recent 
alleged ‘failure’ of the ‘Turkish Model’ for the ‘New Middle East’,7 its regional activism is 
not a new development. It is embedded within a much larger expansion of Turkey not only as 
a regional, but also a global ‘Emerging Power’8 with high levels of foreign investment, 
frequently in the construction sector, all across Africa,9 up to the Western Balkans10 and all 
the way to Latin America.11 While only partially related to this expansion of Turkish capital, 
Turkey’s interventionism not only follows ‘security concerns’ and ‘national interest’ in a 
narrow sense. It has always had strong ethno-political dimensions, as Turkey declared itself 
the protector of all Turkic peoples. This pronounced ethnic dimension was reflected in 
Turkey’s ‘Pan-Turanist’ foreign policy initiative, and the first wave of trade expansion 
towards the East after its liberal opening following the 1980 coup d’état. This element is not 
only strong rhetorically, but also militarily, as Turkmen militia frequently serve as proxies for 
Turkish interests in Iraq and Syria. This has now been complemented by a new rhetoric of 




selectively justified in ethno-nationalist or sectarian terms, identifying potential or actual 
ethnic adversaries to be replaced by ‘rightful owners’, usually of ethno-religious background 
considered to be loyal to Turkey.12  
This underpins most notably Turkey’s 2016 ‘Euphrates Shield’ and 2018 ‘Olive 
Branch’ operations in northern Syria. As a result of these interventions by an alliance of the 
Turkish Armed forces and loyal Syrian militia operating under the ‘Free Syrian Army’ (FSA) 
label, Turkey now controls the entire stretch of its southern border with Syria from Afrin to 
the Western bank of the Euphrates river. This is accompanied by what appears to have 
become a continued effort of sui generis Turkish ‘state building’.13 Ostensibly these 
operations were directed against Daesh and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) affiliated 
YPG/YPJ Syrian Kurdish forces, which were in the process of unifying a statelet along 
Turkey’s southern border. Backed by US military support for their anti-IS struggle, the YPG 
controlled ‘cantons’ declared autonomy and established a northern Syrian federation, 
scheduled elections and built state structures. Ankara considers these an existential threat due 
to their ideological affiliation with the PKK, which Turkey has committed to ‘neutralise’ 
since the 1990s.  
While operations in northern Syria aim at (at least temporary) direct control, there is a 
more complex Turkish involvement in other parts of Syria. Turkey established itself as a 
major power broker in the Astana peace process, in fact entering an alliance with Russia and 
Iran, despite being on opposite sides in the Syrian civil war, thus inspiring allegations of a 
‘Eurasian’ foreign policy shift. Areas in Idlib province, for instance, have Turkish military 
forces but are not under full and formal Turkish control. Initially this intervention, mainly 
directed by the Turkish intelligence agency MIT, was intended to provide a safe haven for 
anti-regime forces. This would realise the regional vision of creating an AKP-friendly 




Having failed both regionally and in Syria, this vision has now turned into a liability, 
whereby Turkey’s radicalised former clients could cause potential harm to the areas under 
Turkish occupation and also within Turkey. Continued Russian-supported advances by the 
regime beg questions about the terms and stability of the Russo-Turkish rapprochement, thus 
increasing the value of territories that Turkey directly and fully controls as safe havens for its 
client rebels.  
Turkey’s interventions are, in all their diversity, thus characterized by three continuities. 
First, they emanate from what Ankara identifies as geopolitical or security necessities. Just 
like the emergence of a Syrian Kurdish state along its southern borders and the PKK’s 
activities in northern Iraq are portrayed as existential threats, so was the 1974 coup d’état in 
Cyprus an inevitable casus belli. Despite political polarisation, there is strong cross-party 
support for the current interventions in Syria and Iraq. Second, despite recent talk of a more 
ambitious and potentially even global role, most Turkish interventions remain regional for 
now. Related, third, is that even if a more realist Turkish security interest is claimed to be at 
stake, most interventions are partly justified by a pan-Turanic ‘duty of care’ for what are 
regarded as ethnic clients under pressure.  
There are three recent developments that may change this picture. The first concerns the 
establishment of new bases further afield, notably. in Qatar, Somalia and, most recently, 
Sudan. These indicate an ambition to project maritime power in the region. The deployments 
in Qatar and Sudan in particular have caused former allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates to view Turkey increasingly as more of a threat than an ally.14 This comes after a 
fall out with Egypt over President Mohamad Morsi’s deposition, leaving Qatar as the only 
meaningful Arab ally. Establishing a presence at geopolitically-sensitive locations in the 
Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, far from Turkey’s immediate environment and, 




regional geopolitical competition. Beyond the Middle East, Turkey has also started being 
more present and vocal in southeast Asia. Both regions are identified as having majority 
Muslim populations receptive for Turkish interests, economic or otherwise. Hence, the hard, 
regional security and ethnic Turkic dimension to Turkey’s interventionism is now 
complemented by a naval element around the Red Sea as well as a ‘soft’ pan-Islamist 
expansion with potentially global reach.  
Yet more significant are changes in Turkey’s state building ambitions in the areas it 
controls. Though it gained some experience providing aid to Northern Cyprus, these 
circumstances were highly specific, not least because of ethno-linguistic commonality. While 
operations in Iraq remain entirely military and security oriented, Somalia and northern Syria 
have now become fields for experimenting with post-conflict development and state building 
entirely led by Turkish institutions and know-how. Both are loosely associated with the UN’s 
state building principles and borrow plenty of practices and policies from Western 
humanitarianism. Turkish state building efforts are nevertheless for the most part run 
independently from the West. In northern Syria, Turkey is trying to build a civil 
administration with elements of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and a host of Turkish public 
and government-loyal NGOs providing essential public services including security.15 Central 
to these efforts is the Turkish disaster relief agency AFAD, which also manages Syrian 
refugee camps in Turkey. Apart from infrastructure reconstruction, these efforts include 
health and education as well as the security sector. Reconstruction follows the imperative of 
the Turkish state being in firm control of all processes, including allocation of contracts to 
Turkish firms. Despite commitment to FSA control, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) retain a 
full occupying force. This also means, however, that Western institutions, including UN 
agencies, while applauding Turkey’s refugee efforts at home, express concerns over the lack 




and are mainly there to contain Kurdish state building efforts. The Turkish activities borrow 
much from Western liberal practice; however, they are also intended as a showcase for an 
independent Turkish development approach and the capabilities of the Turkish state in 
general. Not least, the areas mitigate any new refugee pressures, provide safe havens for 
client fighters displaced from other areas of Syria, but also constitute Turkish bargaining 
chips in any future peace negotiations for Syria.  
Beyond the public commitment to deal with this ‘existential’ or other threats to 
Turkey’s security, the long-term intentions for Syria after any potential settlement remain 
obscure. They reach from a passive-defensive damage limitation to claims about an outright 
‘neo-Ottoman’ expansionism and territorial revisionism of the 1923 Lausanne borders, 
sometimes labelled the ‘Golden Apple’ vision for Turkey. Though not formally occupied like 
the area between Afrin and Jarablus in northern Syria, similar observations can be made 
about northern Iraq, where Turkey maintains a military presence and has recently upscaled 
ground operations against areas under PKK control. Even prior to military operations, the 
region ruled by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is heavily influenced by Turkey, 
including commercially. Oil exports are controlled by Turkey via its Ceyhan port,16 while 
large scale infrastructure and property investments are dominated by Turkish construction 
conglomerates. Interestingly, reconstruction efforts in Iraq and elsewhere come at a time 
when the US administration has repeatedly verbalised its withdrawal from such activities in 
the region.  
Much of the role of Turkey as a semi-independent intervening power reflects the 
politically awkward position its interventionism takes between ambitions for regional 
hegemony, rising global power, and integral part of the old Western order. While full of 
contradictions, this is not a new position for Turkey. Turkey’s interventionism follows a 




‘East’. The semi-colonial nature of the contemporary occupations of northern Syria and 
Cyprus suggests that Turkey’s interventionist agenda is neither outright neo-Ottoman, nor 
entirely anti-colonial, but is dynamic and constantly evolving under rapidly shifting 
geopolitical circumstances.  
In sum, Turkey’s interventions, both prior and during the AKP era, are motivated by 
four key pillars. First, the Western style securitization of its geopolitical environment, mostly 
motivated by the fight against the PKK, but also including the protection of minorities 
considered to be ethnically Turkic. Second, it is impossible to fully understand Turkey’s 
Eurasianist repositioning without its energy-hungry growth ambitions. Lacking sizeable 
resources of its own, both Russia and Iran are indispensable partners, forcing some difficult 
‘Eurasian’ compromises on Turkey, especially in Idlib. This is embedded, third, within an 
agenda of competitive regional power projection. This, indeed, follows historic Ottoman, but 
also pan-Turanic lines, reaching all the way from Sarajevo deep into the Red Sea. Attempting 
to gain strategic salience through partnerships with the Muslim Brotherhood or Qatar is 
viewed as without alternative by Ankara, but this has generated additional problems with 
most Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, all of which are now firmly opposed to 
Turkey’s regional ambitions. Finally, from Bülent Ecevit giving in to popular demands for 
intervention in Cyprus to the contemporary widespread elite and popular support of military 
intervention in Syria and Iraq, military action abroad nurtures a populist militarist nationalism 
at home. Domestic considerations, such as the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections, 
therefore, constitute a determinant of Turkish interventionism. It is this element and the 
resonance of anti-Western rhetoric that makes a clash of geopolitical interests between 
Washington and Ankara appear less of a threat and more of an opportunity to the current 
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